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Using a unique dataset consisting of all corporate loans in Pakistan, we study the impact of 
the global financial crisis (GFC) on the lending ability of its banking sector. We also take 
into account various bank and loan types along with extensive margins, firm size effects and 
impact of information asymmetry. Our findings show that the Pakistani banking sector was 
indeed affected by the GFC as high exposure banks, who borrow relatively more 
internationally, reduce lending to local firms and this impact is larger for small firms. We 
also find differences in the lending ability of various bank types and loan types. By using 
direct information asymmetry measure, we find that banks reduced lending after the 
financial shock. However, the information gathered from the previous relationship of the 
borrower with relatively low exposure banks can overcome the negative financial shock and 
increase lending after the shock. These findings are very relevant in the context of the 
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Banks around the world are interconnected because they provide lending and other financial 
services, not only to domestic financial and non-financial firms, but also to customers abroad. 
On one hand, this interconnection provides liquidity support and reduces the idiosyncratic risk 
of individual banks via diversification, while on the other hand it also leaves banks vulnerable 
to systemic shock in the form of a speculative attack, financial panic, or herd behavior 
(Kleimeier et al., 2008). An important question is whether, and to what extent, this systemic 
shock is transmitted to the real economy.1 In this regard, the impact of the last global financial 
crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 on real businesses has also attracted considerable attention (see 
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Schnabl, 2012; de Haas and van 
Horen, 2013; Berg and Kirschenmann, 2015). However, the impact of the GFC on emerging 
markets has been the subject of relatively few studies, probably due to the limited availability 
of data.2  
As we had access to the relevant data, we study the impact of the GFC on an emerging market. 
In doing so, we analyze the changes in credit availability to firms in Pakistan as a result of the 
exogenous economic shock, measured as borrowing outside Pakistan by Pakistani banks.3 
Since the banks and financial intermediaries in developed countries were directly and most 
severely affected during the GFC, we examine whether transmission of capital flows from 
international banks to local banks in an emerging economy was also affected by the liquidity 
constraints faced by the international banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 
2012). Pakistan had close trading relationship with the countries from where the GFC 
originated. Based on 2006 data, United States was the biggest trading partner of Pakistan. 
Moreover, six European countries were also among the top ten trading partners of Pakistan.4 
We reckon that the countries with significant trading relationship with Pakistan were also 
closely linked to the Pakistani banking sector. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to 
study whether the financial shock that originated in those countries impacted the Pakistani 
economy during the GFC through the credit channel. To that end, we use a unique dataset 
                                                             
1 There is extensive literature which studies the impact of financial shocks on the real economy (see Bernanke, 
1983 and Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992 for early examples). See also BIS (2011) for a survey of the 
linkages between the financial and real sectors. 
2 Among the few papers that have addressed this issue in emerging markets, Paravisini et al. (2015) study credit 
shock to exporting firms in Peru, and Berg & Kirschenmann (2015) study the impact of GFC on the agriculture 
sector in Azerbaijan. 
3 We also use advances outside Pakistan as a percentage of total bank advances as a proxy for calculating 
international exposure to establish if the shock was a general financial one. 
4 Appendix Table 1 shows the trading links with top twelve countries in the world. 
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obtained from the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan, comprising 
all business loans made to firms by commercial banks in Pakistan, to estimate the transmission 
of the economic shock via spillover from banks to real firms.  
In order to establish the adverse effects of international shocks through the banking system, the 
Pakistani banking sector provides an ideal setting to study the transmission of international 
financial shocks, as local banks differ greatly in their international exposure. The international 
exposure of these banks ranges from zero to 22.3%. We measure this international exposure by 
the borrowing of Pakistani banks outside Pakistan from other financial institutions, and 
hypothesize that the higher the borrowing outside Pakistan, the higher the financial shock to 
banks, and hence those banks transmit the shock to the real economy in Pakistan. Our primary 
variables of interest are high, intermediate and low exposure banks, classified as follows. Banks 
which have over 8% of their total borrowing outside Pakistan are considered as high exposure 
ones, while those with between 4% to 8% borrowing outside Pakistan are classified as 
intermediate exposure banks, and those with less than 4% borrowing outside Pakistan as low 
exposure banks.5 The higher the exposure of the banks, the more they are expected to transmit 
the financial shock to the local market.6 This classification is similar to that of Schnabl (2012), 
who classifies banks into these categories and then measures the impact of lending changes by 
each type of bank on firms in Peru. The uniqueness of our dataset lies in the fact that it covers 
the period of the GFC perfectly, i.e., from April 2006 to March 2011. It contains all the business 
loans that were outstanding at the month-end with each bank, which allows us to address the 
identification challenge arising from the economic events that triggered the financial shocks. 
These shocks may also affect credit demand.  
Our findings show that the banking sector in Pakistan was indeed affected by the GFC, as the 
lending ability of various banks was negatively affected (i.e., the intensive margin), similar to 
the findings of Forbes (2001), Forbes and Chinn (2004), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Schnabl 
(2012) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012). Our empirical results also indicate that there was 
transmission of financial shock from international markets to Pakistan. This finding is 
                                                             
5 We have also examined the sensitivity of our results to different exposure thresholds by changing thresholds to 
over 6% (high exposure banks), 3-6% (intermediate exposure banks) and below 3% (low exposure banks) and to 
over 9% (high exposure banks), 5-9% (intermediate exposure banks) and below 5% (low exposure banks). Our 
results are robust to changes in these thresholds and are available upon request from authors. 
6 As discussed above, we also use advances outside Pakistan as a percentage of total bank advances as a proxy 
for calculating international exposure. The higher the exposure outside Pakistan, the greater the chances of 
transmission of shock from outside to domestic Pakistani banks. This definition of transmission is similar to 




interesting because Ali (2009) notes that Pakistan has been relatively well-insulated against 
contagion coming from international financial markets.7 Our results, however, confirm that 
lending by Pakistani banks to local firms was reduced. This reduction in lending was reported 
by the high exposure banks, while there was increase in lending by the low/relatively low8 
exposure banks. We also find that “foreign” banks9 transmit the global financial crisis shock 
and reduce their lending. The findings on the exit from the market of old firms and the extension 
of credit to new firms (i.e., the extensive margin) indicate that the firms which borrowd from 
relatively low exposure banks are less likely to exit and are more likely to have survived after 
the crisis. However, lending to small firms was reduced, irrespective of whether they borrowed 
from relatively low or high exposure banks. The findings regarding different types of banks 
reveal that private and big banks reduce their lending; however, contrary to Farooq and Zaheer 
(2015), we do not find any statistically significant evidence that the granting of Islamic loans 
increased after the financial shock. We find that high exposure banks reduced their agricultural 
loans after the financial shock in contrast with Berg and Kirschenmann (2015). However, 
relatively low exposure banks increased their lending in that regard. This is intuitive, because 
the relatively low exposure banks are mostly domestic, small banks, which mainly focus on 
agriculture financing. Our findings on information asymmetry show that bank reputation as a 
proxy for information asymmetry, as well as the previous interaction of the borrower with the 
bank, were not able to overcome the information asymmetry problems and banks still reduced 
lending after a financial shock. However, highly reputed banks with relatively low exposure 
were able to overcome the information asymmetry problems and increased their lending after 
the GFC. 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it complements the rare 
literature on the transmission of the global financial crisis from developed countries to banks 
and firms in an emerging economy. Second, we provide a detailed analysis of different bank 
types (e.g., private and privatized banks10) and different types of loans (e.g., Islamic, export 
                                                             
7 Dungey and Gajurel (2015), however, in a mutli-country study, show that Pakistani banking sector 
experienced systemic and idiosyncratic contagion during the global financial crisis. 
8
 From Table 4 onward, we combine the intermediate exposure and low exposure bank proxies, and use the term 
‘relatively low’ exposure banks. Therefore, banks with 8% or less international exposures are classified as 
relatively low exposure banks. 
9 “Foreign” banks are those banks, a treatment group, who have international borrowing compared to the banks 
which do not have any international borrowing at all, a control group. 
10 Four large government owned banks in Pakistan were privatized in the massive wave of banking sector 
privatization during the 1990s. Because of this, they are classified as ‘privatized’ in our database, and we 
continue using this term throughout this paper. This ‘privatized’ proxy should also be considered as a proxy for 
large banks, because they have about 41% of the market share. 
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and agriculture loans) provided by local banks. By doing this, we are better able to analyze the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the real economy in Pakistan. Third, our analysis also 
sheds light on information asymmetry and its impact on lending changes after the recent 
financial crisis using loan level data. Lastly, our dataset perfectly covers the relevant data 
period, i.e., from April 2006 to March 2011, giving us the possibility to conduct the analysis 
for both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.11 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the study background, 
while Section 3 describes the data. The methodology adopted in the paper is described in 
section 4. Section 5 presents the results and the conclusion is provided in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical background and related literature 
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is the literature on the transmission 
of financial shocks, which operates through various channels. Next to the asset price channel12 
of transmission, the credit channel operates through information asymmetry in financial 
markets.13 This channel proposes two types of transmission: the bank lending channel and 
firms’ borrowing channel. According to the bank lending channel, banks play an important role 
in solving the asymmetric information problem; certain borrowers will not be able to have 
access to credit in the presence of a financial shock to banks. Existing work on the bank lending 
channel includes Kashyap et al. (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1997), Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
Ashcraft (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Cetorreli and Goldberg (2012). The firm 
borrowing channel implies that when a financial shock reduces the net worth of firms, it raises 
the adverse selection problem, leading to a decreased lending to firms. A decline in net worth 
also increases the moral hazard problem because firms have lower equity at stake and are more 
likely to engage in risky investment projects. Lenders can observe this and reduce lending to 
firms (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996; Bernanke et al., 1996). Other papers have analyzed the 
transmission channels of international financial shocks through the banking system. Allen 
(2012) showed that bank liquidity shocks are transmitted from the parent to the subsidiary, 
                                                             
11 Earlier papers using the same data included the period 1996-2001/2 (Khwaja and Mian, 2005, 2008; Mian, 
2006; Zia, 2008) and April 2006 to December 2008 (Baele et al., 2014). 
12 See Taylor (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for the interest rate channel, Bryant et al. (1993) and 
Macdonald and Taylor (1993) for the exchange rate channel, and Modigiliani (1975) for the wealth effects of 
transmission. 




thereby negatively affecting lending by the subsidiaries. Similarly, Kane et al. (2015) studied 
the channels which affect credit provision during a financial crisis. Their results indicate that 
cross-border lending was affected, mainly due to liquidity difficulties faced by international 
banks and increased uncertainty.  
The second strand of literature which our paper relates to is international financial contagion. 
The literature on this strand can be divided into studies focusing on financial sector linkages 
for the propagation of economic shock (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2005; 
Bekaert et al., 2005; Derviz and Podpiera, 2007; Jokashthira et al., 2013), and others which 
focus on trade linkages (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Forbes, 2001, 2004; Claessens and Forbes, 
2001; Forbes and Chinn, 2004; Blanchard et al., 2010). Forbes (2001) describes three channels 
through which an economic shock can be transmitted to other countries: a competitiveness 
effect, which has a negative effect on exports because of the adverse impact on relative 
competitiveness; an income effect, which also has a negative effect because of the adverse 
impact on income in the importing country and hence a reduction in demand for imports; and 
a cheap import effect,  which has a positive effect because of the positive impact on relative 
competitiveness, and hence an increase in demand for imports. This paper complements the 
research on the international transmission of financial shocks and international financial 
contagion. 
Overall, our study relates closely to work by Khwaja and Mian (2008), Schnabl (2012) and 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010). Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2012) study the 
transmission of liquidity shock to real firms by using firm fixed effects to identify the bank 
lending channel. These studies, however, differ from ours, as that of Khwaja and Mian (2008) 
analyzes the transmission of domestic liquidity, whereas Schnabl (2012) studies the 
transmission of liquidity shock across countries. We discuss the spillover of financial shock 
from the developed world to an emerging economy during the global financial crisis, and 
subsequently the transmission of that financial shock to real firms by local banks.  Our paper 
is also different from that of Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) in the sense that they analyze the 
financial contagion from banking systems in developed countries to emerging markets, using 
data on capital flows within global banks, while we study the transmission of financial shock 





We use a unique dataset for our empirical analysis which primarily consists of loans provided 
by Pakistani banks to local firms. The data were obtained from the Consumer Protection 
Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, which maintains the domestic credit registry known 
as the Credit Information Bureau (CIB). CIB is an online facility that allows financial 
institutions to upload and retrieve information through a virtual private network. Since 2006, 
the State Bank of Pakistan has upgraded the CIB’s technical and reporting structure. The new 
facility has the capacity to incorporate a large number of validation rules to ensure the integrity 
and accuracy of the submitted data. Banks in Pakistan verify the credit history of a loan 
applicant with CIB if the application exceeds PKR 500,000. The CIB dataset has already been 
studied in different contexts by Khwaja and Mian (2005, 2008), Mian (2006), Zia (2008) and 
Baele et al. (2014).14 Our data cover the period from April 2006 to March 2011, spanning the 
period before and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
The CIB reports the identity code for each loan contract. Based on this, we can identify the 
industry and total exposure of the borrower. In addition, the database provides information on 
key loan characteristics, such as maturity, collateral, product name, type of loan, the approved 
limit and the remaining outstanding amount. Because the database does not provide banks’ 
financial information, data on bank characteristics such as total capital ratio, total assets, liquid 
assets and the number of branches of each bank were obtained from Bankscope. 
As we are studying the impact of the financial crisis on the changes in lending ability of the 
Pakistani banking sector, we divided our data into three samples: pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis. The pre-crisis period includes data from April 2006 to June 2007; the crisis period ranges 
from July 2007 to March 2009; and post-crisis is from April 2009 to March 2011. We follow 
Dungey and Gajurel (2015) in defining the crisis period. They use July 2007 to March 2009 as 
a crisis period and find that Pakistani banking sector experienced systematic contagion as well 
as idiosyncratic contagion during the global financial crisis. 15 
Because we are interested in the changes in lending before and after the crisis, we start with 
100,938 loan observations from 23,188 borrowers.16 We discard all loans given by any other 
                                                             
14 Because of the technical and reporting structure upgrade, the quality of the data has further improved since 
2006.  
15 We also use NBER US recessions to define the crisis period from January 2008 to July 2009. The recession 
period in the US was from December 2007 to June 2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Except for Export 
and Islamic loans, our results are not sensitive to a slightly different definition of the crisis period (January 2008 
to July 2009).  
16 Our original dataset included almost 6 million loan-month observations during the 59-month sample period 
(April 2006 to March 2011) 
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financial institution except twenty one commercial banks, which gives us 71,621 observations. 
We also discard loans given as a non-funded facility, which then leaves us with 59,183 
observations. Some of our analysis contains all these observations. However, because of the 
firm fixed effects approach, we filter out the borrowers who borrowed only from one bank and 
include only those firms which borrowed from more than one bank prior to the crisis. In the 
next step, we consolidate the borrowing portfolios of all borrowers corresponding to the 
respective lenders, controlling for the various financial products under consideration.17 This 
gives us 33,245 observations; most of our analysis is made on this number of observations, 
from 11,524 borrowers.  
The filtered dataset includes a total of twenty one banking institutions in Pakistan. These 
include eight private, four privatized, two provincial and two nationalized banks, two foreign 
and three Islamic banks operating in Pakistan. Our dependent variable is the change in loan 
i of firm j from bank b (ΔLijb). We transform all the loan values to logarithmic form and 
obtain the difference between the logarithmic values of lending by banks prior to and after 
the shock, such that a positive value indicates that there has been an increase in lending post 
financial crisis, and a negative value indicates that lending has decreased following the GFC. 
Our primary variables of interest are high, intermediate and low exposure banks. As 
explained above, we classify these as follows: banks which have over 8% of their borrowing 
from outside Pakistan are considered as high exposure and those with between 4% to 8% 
and less than 4% borrowing from outside Pakistan are classified as intermediate exposure 
and low exposure banks, respectively. The higher the exposure of banks, the more they are 
expected to transmit financial shock to the local market. This classification is similar to that 
of Schnabl (2012), who classifies banks into these categories and then measures the impact 
of lending changes by each type of bank to firms in Peru. In Table 1, we provide the list of 
banks in our dataset along with their average market share measured as average total assets 
as a percent of average total assets of all the banks for the period from 2006 to 2011 in our 
dataset. We also provide average borrowing outside Pakistan as a percent of total borrowing 
for the period from 2006 to 2011. We observe international exposure of banks from zero to 
22.3% and there is enough variation in the sample to exploit the transmission of global 
                                                             
17 For example, if firm A borrows from bank B in two ways through products Y and Z, we then consolidate the 
borrowing from bank B with respect to both the products, so there will be two observations from bank B: one w.r.t 
product Y and the other w.r.t Z. In this way we are able to ascertain the changes in lending of the various product 
types in our analysis.  
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financial crisis shock. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
In addition to our core proxies, we use a number of control variables, which have been shown 
to influence the change in bank lending to real firms. We focus on bank and borrower/loan 
characteristics and follow the literature (see, for example, Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 
2012; Baele et al., 2014; Zaheer and Farooq, 2015) when selecting and measuring these 
controls. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) show that better capitalized and more liquid banks were 
better able to continue credit supply during the 2007–2008 crisis. Building on this finding, we 
use the bank capital ratio as a proxy for solvency, and the liquid assets to total assets ratio as a 
proxy for bank liquidity. In addition, we add the natural log of the number of branches as a 
control variable, as the branch network is one of the factors leading to bank runs during a crisis 
(He and Manela, 2012). Furthermore, the size of bank may also affect changes in lending, 
because larger banks are typically considered to be more stable. We use total bank assets as a 
proxy for the size of the bank. For borrower/loan characteristics, we use size of loan as the 
proxy for the size of the borrower. In addition to loan size, we also consider other loan 
characteristics including loan maturity, whether the loan is secured, and whether it is a 
performing loan. Loan maturity can have a negative impact on the change in lending if banks 
do not want to commit a large amount of funds over a long term. Similarly, security for the 
loan, and whether the loan is performing, are also important because they may have an effect 
on the lending ability of banks. Finally, we also use loan type dummies, bank controls and firm 
fixed effects for some regressions as robustness checks. Details of the variables used in the 
paper and their definitions are given in Appendix Table 2. 
 
4.   Methodology 
This section outlines the econometric setting that we use to estimate the transmission of bank 
financial shocks to real firms. This estimation poses a key empirical identification problem 
arising from changes in credit supply by Pakistani banks, and credit demand by Pakistani 
firms. For example, a reduction in lending by a bank to a firm may reflect a credit supply 
shortage in the bank, lower credit demand from the firm, or a combination of both. More 
specifically, if an export-oriented local firm (e.g., Nishat Mills) borrows more from a foreign 
bank (e.g.,  Citibank), and its export opportunities decrease following the global financial 
crisis, then Nishat Mills might reduce borrowing from Citibank, and Citibank’s lending may 
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decrease relative to a local bank (e.g., United Bank Limited). To address this potential 
identification problem, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2012) and use firm 
fixed effects and consider the fact that the same firm borrows from more than one bank. Our 
analysis controls for the changes in credit demand at the firm level by checking for loan 
relationships within firms, rather than across firms. Thus if a firm is borrowing from both 
bank A and bank B, we check for the changes in borrowing from bank A relative to bank B 
by the same firm. Using this approach we are able to identify the changes in credit demand 
by firms due to the changes in credit supply from banks.  
 
We implement the following strategy for identification using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. We start with baseline model of Schnabl (2012), which is as follows: 
 
ΔLijb= βj +βlEb+εijb   - - - - - - -(1) 
 
The dependent variable in equation (1), ΔLijb is the change in loan i of firm j from bank b 
which shows the changes in borrowing by a firm from a bank prior to and after the financial 
shock. The right hand side of the above equation includes β1 which are firm fixed effects 
that absorb all firm specific credit demand shocks, while Eb denotes exposure of the bank to 
a financial shock. We identify bank exposure in three categories: high, intermediate and low. 
In order to include the control variables and other variables of interest we extend the baseline 
model (1) and estimate the following model (2): 
 
ΔLijb= β1 +β2Eb+ β3Xbt+ β4Yi,jt+ β5Zt+εijb   - - - - - - -(2) 
 
β2 in model (2) is the coefficient of interest and checks the transmission of a financial shock 
after controlling for credit-demand shocks at the firm level.  The key assumption in the 
analysis is that all firms reduce their lending in equal proportions from all banks after the 
credit crunch. This assumption is plausible for both high and intermediate exposure banks 
due to their similar characteristics, but not for low exposure banks. Therefore, we control 
for bank characteristics (Xbt) in our analysis. The sample is restricted to firms that borrow 
from more than one bank prior to the shock. As the specification includes firm fixed effects, 
the coefficient of interest is calculated only for firms that borrow from more than one bank. 
In addition to the bank characteristics, we also control for borrower/loan characteristics (Yit) 
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and macroeconomic variables (Zt) to capture any borrower/loan and macroeconomic factors 
that might have an impact on changes in loan i of firm j from bank b (ΔLijb).  
 
5. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for 33,245 loans to 11,524 borrowers from 21 banks; 
these are also reported by exposure type. The high and intermediate exposure banks are similar 
in number, but the intermediate ones are larger in size, which can be seen by the average of 
total assets for both categories, which are PKR 42,412 million18 and PKR 47,868 million 
respectively. Low exposure banks are quite small in size compared to the high and intermediate 
exposure ones. Liquid assets are approximately 14.1%, 19.8% and 13.2% of total assets for the 
high, intermediate and low exposure banks, respectively, making intermediate exposure banks 
the most liquid of all the categories. However, the high exposure banks are the best capitalized, 
and the mean capital ratios for the high, intermediate and low exposure banks are 15.4%, 13.8% 
and 11.6%, respectively. It is interesting to see if high exposure banks transmit shocks to firms 
despite being the best capitalized. The presence of intermediate exposure banks is greater, with 
a median of 1,078 branches, compared to high exposure banks with a median of 994 branches, 
and low exposure banks with 122. This shows that most of the big banks with large branch 
networks fall into the category of intermediate exposure. The highest percentage in the high 
exposure category is that of privatized banks with 73.9%, followed by foreign banks with 
14.4%. In the intermediate exposure category, the largest percentage is that of nationalized 
banks, at 43.5%, followed by private banks at 28.6%. However, the low exposure banks are 
mostly private banks, with 61.6% of the total banks, followed by privatized banks with 18.5%. 
We observe that the characteristics of the high, intermediate and low exposure banks are quite 
similar with regard to the highest number of loans being term loans, followed by export loans.  
 (Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
4.2 Bank lending channel 
                                                             
18 1 USD ~ 124 PKR, 1 EUR ~ 146 PKR and 1 GBP ~ 163 PKR on 31st July 2018. 
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The findings related to the transmission of financial shocks to real firms are reported in Table 
3. Column 1 shows our baseline results. The results provide support for our theoretical 
argument, which is consistent with Schnabl (2012) that intermediate and low exposure banks 
increased their lending because of the international financial shock post-GFC. The low 
exposure banks increased their lending more than the intermediate exposure ones. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the less that banks are exposed internationally, the lower 
the shock they transmit to the real economy. However, when we include bank, borrower, loan 
and macroeconomic controls in our model (equation 2), as shown in columns 2, 3 and 4 of 
Table 3, the intermediate exposure banks increase their lending to firms more than the low 
exposure ones.19 This is perhaps due to the fact that intermediate exposure banks are the most 
liquid of all the categories and are able to withstand international financial shocks. The 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients of the other control variables are 
mostly in line with the literature. We find positive coefficients for capital ratio, meaning that 
the better capitalized banks increased their lending after the crisis, confirming the findings of 
Kapan and Miniou (2013) that better capitalized banks can better withstand shock. However, 
we find negative coefficients for the liquid assets to total asset ratio, showing that the more 
liquid banks reduce their lending after the financial shock. We find that the big banks provide 
more lending to big borrowers after the shock, as shown by the positive significant coefficients 
of the natural logarithm of total assets, as well as the natural logarithm of loan size. The banks 
with large branch networks reduced their lending after the financial shock.  
In column 3, we run the same regression as in column 2 but with macronomic variables. We 
add macroeconomic variables like GDP growth and natural logarithm of manufacturing 
production20,21 to control for the effect of economic contraction/recession.22 We find negative 
relationship with both the economic variables indicating that economic contraction/recession 
indeed leads to reduction in lending after the financial shock. Overall we find the same results 
                                                             
19 This is contrary to Schanbl (2012). However, when we use advances outside Pakistan to determine the 
international exposure of banks, we find similar results. 
20 We restrict ourselves to using only GDP growth and natural logarithm of manufacturing production because 
of high correlation with other macroeconomic variables.  
21 We also use other macroeconomic variables like CPI, natural logrithm of manufacturing production and 
unemployment rate that show mild correlation. The results, not reported here, remain robust with the inclusion 
of these macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, despite high correlation we use all the macroeconomic 
variables like GDP growth, CPI, natural logrithm of manufacturing production, unemployment rate, natural 
logarithm of trade deficit, interest rate and natural logarithm of broad money. Our results, not reported here, 
remain consistent even with the inclusion of all these macroeconomic variables.  
 
22 We thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this very important point.  
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as in Column 2 but the coefficients of the intermediate and low exposure banks are smaller in 
magnitude. Moreover, all the control variables keep the same sign, except the coefficient of 
natural logarithm of maturity and secured loans. In column 4, we show the bank lending 
channel using complete model with all the controls and firm fixed effects. The coefficients of 
both the intermediate and low exposure banks slightly increase in magnitude compared to the 
results in column 3. However, all the control variables remain the same economically and 
statistically. This indicates that the changes in lending can only be explained by the financial 
shock.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
In order to find the lending effect of “pure” domestic banks which do not have international 
borrowing, we classify banks in a control group and in a treatment group.23 Control group 
includes purely “domestic” banks24 which do not borrow internationally at all and treatment 
group includes “foreign” banks that do have international borrowing. We keep the structure of 
the regression models same as in Table 3. The results reported in Table 4 show that treatment 
group, “foreign” banks being international borrower, transmit the financial crisis shock and 
reduce lending after the crisis.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
4.3 Extensive margin results  
Following Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014), we also study whether 
the financial shock had an impact on the extensive margin of banks, by forcing firms to exit 
the market or reducing the entry of new firms. The results are reported in Table 5. We define 
‘Exit’ to be equal to 1 if the loan is not renewed at some point during the GFC period. We use 
all the bank and borrower/loan characteristics and loan type controls in all our regressions. As 
previously, we start our analysis with firm fixed effects to control for changes in demand at the 
firm level. The results are shown in column 1 of Table 5. We find that a one standard deviation 
increase in borrowing from intermediate and low exposure banks reduces exits by 1.06 
percentage points. In addition, we run a non-linear probit model, whose results are reported in 
column 2. Economically, the results are stronger than FE model. Overall, we conclude that 
                                                             
23 We thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this very important point. 
24 We also make two different control groups. In one group, we classify banks as “domestic” if their international 
borrowing is less than 0.5% and in the other group; we classify banks as “domestic” if their international 
borrowing is less than 1%. Our results remain consistent with these two additional classifications.  
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firms borrowing from intermediate exposure banks are less likely to exit the market after the 
financial shock, and that this likelihood is even lower if they borrow from low exposure banks.  
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we show banks’ ability to make new loans. We use ‘Entry’ as 
a dependent variable to study this, defined as 1 if a new loan is made after the financial shock 
(during the period from April 2009 to March 2011). Again, we use all the bank and 
borrower/loan characteristics and loan type controls in all of our regressions. Similarly, we also 
run FE and non-linear probit models to study this. In column 3, we show the results of our 
preferred FE model and find that a one standard deviation increase in borrowing from 
intermediate exposure banks increases the entry of firms by 1.01 percentage points (the results 
are not statistically different from zero) and by 1.02 points in the case of low exposure banks. 
Similar to what was observed in the results for ‘Exit’, the results are stronger for the non-linear 
probit model. Overall, we find that firms borrowing from low exposure banks are more likely 
to obtain new loans after a financial shock, and that this likelihood is higher if they borrow 
from intermediate exposure banks.  
 (Insert Table 5 about here)  
We further extend our analysis of the extensive margin to observe if the impact of financial 
shock on the ‘Exit’ and ‘Entry’ of small firms is the same. For this, we combine the proxies of 
the intermediate and low exposure banks, terming them ‘Relatively low’ exposure banks. The 
results are reported in Table 6. In column 1 of Table 6, we run regression with only the 
‘Relatively low’ proxy, and find that the effect is same as that shown by the intermediate and 
low exposure proxies separately. Since most of the small firms have only one bank relationship, 
we run OLS regression and report the results in column 4; for comparison, we run FE regression 
in column 2. We obtain very similar results in both models, showing that small firms are more 
likely to exit the market after a financial shock. However, the interaction between ‘small firms’ 
and ‘relatively low’ exposure firms still gives a negative sign, but only statistically significant 
in FE regression, indicating that small firms borrowing from relatively low exposure banks are 
less likely to exit the market. To be consistent with Table 5, we also run a non-linear probit 
model and find very similar results. With regard to entry into the loan market, small firms are 
less likely to obtain a new loan after the financial shock. However, our results are not 
statistically different from zero if they borrow from relatively low exposure banks. The results 
are economically the same if we run a non-linear probit model. Overall, our results are 
consistent with previous research that small firms are adversely affected during a financial 
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shock (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995, 2002). However, our results are 
different from Khwaja and Mian (2008) in this particular context of the extensive margin for 
small firms. They find no difference between smaller and larger firms, whereas we find that 
smaller firms are adversely affected during the financial shock. One possible explanation in 
our setting is that the quantum of the shock originating from GFC is much higher than the 
domestic liquidity shock after the nuclear tests of May 1998 by Pakistan, as studied by Khwaja 
and Mian (2008). 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
4.4 Bank lending channel for small firms 
In Table 3, we found interesting results for the intensive margin of small firms. We therefore 
extend the analysis of Table 3 to small firms, and show the corresponding results of the bank 
lending channel in Table 7. Our dependent variable is the same as in Table 3, i.e., the log 
change in bank lending during the crisis. In column 1 of Table 7, we start with our full FE 
model, as in column 3 of Table 3, meaning that we include all the bank and borrower/loan 
characteristics, together with loan type dummies, bank control and macroeconomic variables, 
but we use our new combined proxy of ‘Relatively low’ exposure banks. We find a positive 
coefficient (Tabe 7, column 1) showing that relatively low exposure banks increased their 
lending after the financial crisis.  However, we can see from the statistically significant negative 
sign in column 2 that lending to small firms was reduced during the financial crisis. We also 
do not find any significant effect if smaller firms borrowed from relatively low exposure banks. 
As explained above, since most of the small firms have only one relationship, we run OLS 
regression in column 4 to study the bank lending channel for small firms. The results are 
stronger, confirming our argument that smaller firms mostly borrow from only one bank. This 
also shows that the variation in lending by relatively low exposure banks across firms is higher 
than the variation in lending within firms. These results are consistent with those of Khwaja 
and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2012), showing that lending to small firms is affected more by 
the major banks after an exogenous shock in the domestic market.  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
4.5 Bank lending channel for different bank types 
We now turn our attention to checking the impact of exogenous shock on the different bank 
types in Pakistan, and report the results in Table 8. Private and privatized banks make the 
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highest percentage of loans in Pakistan. We call privatized banks as “Big banks” in Table 8.25 
We therefore check whether there are any differences if these are relatively low or high 
exposure banks. We classify small local banks as private banks, contrary to the list issued by 
the State Bank of Pakistan.26 We exclude the top four big banks from this list and show their 
bank lending channels separately. The results for private banks are reported in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 8. We can see from the ‘Private bank’ dummy that this type of bank increases 
lending after the financial shock. However, if these private banks are relatively low exposure 
banks, they reduce their lending after the financial shock. The results remain the same without 
firm fixed effects when we run OLS regression in column 3. Next, we devise a ‘Big bank’ 
dummy equal to 1 if the bank is one of the four big banks. As expected, big (privatized) banks 
reduced their lending to real firms after the financial shock, whereas these banks increased their 
lending if they are relatively low exposure banks. The results are quite intuitive, and show that 
big highly exposed banks transmit financial shock to real firms.  
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
4.6 Bank lending channel for different loan types 
Following Schnabl (2012), Farooq and Zaheer (2015) and Berg and Kirschenmann (2015), we 
study the bank lending channel via export loans, Islamic loans27 and agricultural loans. The 
results are reported in Table 9. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 do not find any change in lending 
by both relatively low and high exposure banks. These results are similar to those of Schnabl 
(2012) because he also does not find any change in lending by either intermediate or low 
exposure banks for exporters. However, he finds that intermediate exposure banks increase 
lending to non-exporters after the liquidity shock.28 
Next, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, we show the change in lending by Islamic Banks. In 
Pakistan, conventional and Islamic banking co-exist. Islamic Banking refers to a system of 
banking or banking practices that are consistent, both in objectives and operations, with the 
Shari’ah. As highlighted by Baele et al. (2014), the key distinguishing features of Islamic 
                                                             
25 As noted before, top four big privatized banks have about 41% of the market share. 
26 http://sbp.org.pk/f_links/index.asp 
27 Note there are Islamic branches of conventional banks in Pakistan, so there are loans extended by these 
branches.  
28 When we split the sample into intermediate exposure and low exposure banks, as done by Schnabl (2012), we 
find very similar results - that our findings for exporters are not statistically significant for either intermediate or 
low exposure banks and for non-exporters; both intermediate and low exposure banks increase their lending. We 
do not report these results due to limited space. 
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Banking, the prohibition of interest (riba), excessive leverage, and its focus on risk sharing, 
may make Islamic banks quite different from conventional banks.29 Some papers look at the 
comparative performance of Islamic and conventional banks during the GFC (for example, 
Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Farooq and Zaheer, 2015). They conclude that 
Islamic banks performed better in terms of profitability, intermediation ratio, asset quality and 
resilience to financial shocks. Our analysis is closely related to that of Farooq and Zaheer 
(2015), who use bank level data and show that Islamic banks granted more loans during 
financial crisis. We use loan level data to look at the same impact; however, in our case the 
financial panic is not home grown, but comes from abroad. Furthermore, we look at how 
different exposure banks make Islamic loans. Contrary to Farooq and Zaheer (2015), we do not 
find that banks granted more Islamic loans during periods of GFC as can be seen from the 
‘Islamic loan’ dummy, as well as the interaction between ‘Islamic loan’ and ‘relatively low’ in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 9. In unreported results we find that the results are sentitive to the 
inclusion of macroeconomic variables. With the exclusion of macroeconomic variables, we 
find that banks grant more Islamic loans during the financial shock but relatively low exposure 
banks reduce advancing Islamic loans. This finding shows that the granting of Islamic loans is 
dependent on the economic contraction/recession. A severe shock has stronger impact on the 
behaviour of Islamic banks while granting Islamic loans. Overall, we see that the impact of a 
financial shock on Islamic loans is similar to conventional loans. This finding is similar to those 
of Bader et al. (2008) and Chong and Liu (2009).  
Finally, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9, we conduct analysis of agricultural loans. As highlighted 
by Berg and Kirschenmann (2015) in the context of Azerbaijan, agriculture is a very local 
sector for an agriculture-based economy. Lending to such a sector is thus expected to be 
immuned to any global financial shock. Similar to Azerbaijan, Pakistan is also an agriculture-
based economy and our dataset allows us to segregate loans given for agricultural purposes. 
We devise an ‘Agri’ dummy equal to 1 if the loan is given for such purposes. Contrary to 
economic theory, we find that even loans to the agriculture sector decreased following the 
financial shock, as can be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficient ‘Agri’ 
in column 5 of Table 9. However, the relatively low exposure banks increased their granting 
of agricultural loans.  
                                                             
29 Consistent with the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan, we use the term Islamic 
banking for banks operating as Islamic banks as per the definition given above; all other banks being 
conventional banks.  
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 (Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
4.7 Bank lending channel and information asymmetry 
One of the contributions of this paper is the results shown in Table 10, which represent the 
impact of information asymmetry on the changes in lending to firms during the GFC. We devise 
direct proxies of information asymmetry following Sufi (2007), Bharath et al. (2011) and 
Chaudhry and Kleimeier (2015) and observe the bank lending channel via information 
asymmetry between the borrower and lender. Our first proxy is the natural log of 1+ number 
of previous loans ‘Ln(1+no of previous loans)’. This proxy relates to the borrower’s reputation 
in the credit market and whether this reputation has any impact on changes in lending after the 
financial shock. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 10. We do not find any impact 
of borrower reputation on the lending decision of banks, as can be seen from the statistically 
insignificant coefficient of ‘Ln(1+no of previous loans)’. Since we do not find any significance, 
we do not make any further analysis of borrower reputation.   
Next, using the market share of deposits as a proxy for bank reputation, we assume that the 
banks with a higher reputation would perhaps not reduce their lending following the financial 
shock, due to a fear of loss of reputation and hence their share of deposits. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, we find that highly reputed banks reduce their lending after a financial shock and 
are not able to withstand the financial shock by themselves. However, we do not find any 
significant impact if these reputed banks have relatively low exposure. The results are given in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 10. 
Following Sufi (2007), we distinguish the presence of information asymmetry by using a 
relationship dummy. We code ‘relationship’ equal to 1 if the borrower has previously obtained 
a loan from the same bank. Here, we want to see if previous interaction between the bank and 
the borrower reduces information asymmetry and that the bank can withstand the financial 
shock and is able to increase lending. We expect to find a positive sign for the ‘relationship’ 
proxy if the information about the borrower is so positive that it can overcome the negative 
financial shock. We do not find any statistically significant impact of only ‘relationship’ 
dummy but we do find positive and significant impact of the interaction of relationship with 
the relatively low exposure banks in columns 4 and 5 of Table 10. This indicates that the 
information abou the borrower is so positive that it is able to overcome the negative financial 
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shock. We find very similar results when we use the REL number proxy proposed by Bharath 
et al. (2011). The REL number is defined as the ratio of number of loans advanced by a bank 
to a borrower and the total number of loans advanced by that bank. Overall, the results from 
this table are consistent with our main results that only relatively low exposure banks are able 
to withstand the financial shock.  
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
6. Conclusion 
As small developing countries may be more vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks due to 
inherent political instability and financial risk, it is important to analyze the impact of the 
financial crisis on real businesses in those economies. Moreover, in the absence of fully 
developed capital and financial markets, most local businesses rely heavily on bank financing 
in developing markets. The small and medium enterprises that form the core of emerging 
markets may also suffer due to the shortage of funds from banks and other financial institutions 
as a result of exogenous economic shocks. 
Studying the Pakistani market as a case in point, and capitalizing on the unique dataset of all 
corporate loans, we have identified changes in post-financial shock lending using various bank 
and loan level variables. We have shown that lending to small firms and lending by private 
banks decreased, irrespective of the fact whether they borrowed from low or high exposure 
banks. However, lending by relatively low exposure big banks increased after the global 
financial crisis. The findings regarding different types of loans revealed that Agricultural loans 
increased after the financial shock (i.e., GFC), both from relatively low exposure banks. Our 
findings on information asymmetry showed that bank reputation as a proxy for information 
asymmetry was not able to overcome information asymmetry problems and that high exposure 
banks still reduced their lending after the financial shock. However, previous interactions of 
the borrower with relatively low exposure banks were able to overcome these problems and 
increased their lending after the GFC.  
 
Our work is important from a regulatory perspective as it identifies that emerging markets are 
open to shocks from the international financial markets, despite their limited linkages with 
them, hence mechanisms need to be developed to better cope with any such events in the future. 
This brings us to areas for further research; first, we would like to check the impact of financial 
shock on the interbank market of Pakistan, to see whether the liquidity crunch only affected 
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firms, or also interbank liquidity. Another interesting potential area of research could be on the 
regulatory side, observing the current funding structures of banks in the country and devising 
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National Bank of Pakistan 16.92           7.60             
Habib Bank Limited 15.48           22.30           
United Bank Limited 10.71           7.30             
MCB Bank Limited 8.44             9.60             
Allied Bank of Pakistan 7.60             0.70             
Standard Chartered Bank Pakistan Limited 5.85             8.90             
Askari Bank Limited 4.70             0.40             
The Bank of Punjab 4.58             0.50             
NIB Bank 4.04             0.40             
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 3.85             2.50             
Faysal Bank Limited 3.40             0.60             
Bank Alhabib Limited 3.03             4.80             
Meezan Bank 2.85             0.90             
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.72             0.10             
Soneri Bank Limited 1.70             8.80             
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 0.85             0.00
KASB Bank Limited 0.82             6.00             
AlBaraka Bank Pakistan Limited 0.82             16.70           
Mybank Limited 0.75             1.70             
The Bank of Khyber 0.71             1.20             
First Women Bank Limited 0.20             0.00
Table 1
This table provides average market share by total assets and average
borrowing outside Pakistan by Pakistani banks from 2006 to 2011. Column
(1) lists the all the banks in our dataset ranked by market share. Column (2)
reports the market share and Column (3) reports borrowing outside Pakistan
by Pakistani banks as a percent of total borrowing.




Mean Median St dev Mean Median St dev Mean Median St dev Mean Median St dev
Loan characteristics
  Loan size 1,920     62         15,942    2,060       50                19,076          2,730     72         22,320    1,390     66         68,812   
  Maturity 761        365        992        722          365              1,055           726        364        1,098     807        375        880        
  Secured 0.950     1.000     0.217     0.947       1.000           0.224           0.927     1.000     0.259     0.965     1.000     0.184     
  Non performing loans 0.078     0 0.269     0.068       0.137           0.251           0.137     0.137     0.344     0.055     0.137     0.228     
Bank characteristics
  Capital ratio 13.311   12.360   4.501     15.391     13.390         4.957           13.792   10.580   4.247     11.575   10.980   3.482     
  Total assets 33,129   31,478   23,254    42,412      34,320          2,242           47,868   54,682   27,314    18,780   17,286   89,040   
  Liquid assets 5,240     3,560     4,325     5,990       6,020           2,980           9,460     9,800     5,583     2,490     2,120     1,366     
  Number of branches 620        272        536        946          994              544              880        1,078     482        252        122        250        
Bank types (%)
  Nationalized Banks 0.105     0.307     0.137       0.137           0.435     0.496     0.007     0.086     
  Private 0.379     0.485     0.117       0.322           0.286     0.452     0.616     0.487     
  Privatized 0.384     0.486     0.739       0.439           0.279     0.449     0.185     0.388     
  Islamic 0.052     0.222     0.024       0.154           0.030     0.170     0.083     0.276     
  Foreign 0.089     0.285     0.144       0.351           0.137     0.137     0.097     0.296     
Loan types (%)
  Agriculture 0.014     0.118     0.022       0.146           0.020     0.140     0.006     0.074     
  Consumer loans 0.001     0.038     -          -              0.001     0.030     0.003     0.052     
  Export loans 0.287     0.453     0.296       0.456           0.247     0.431     0.303     0.460     
  Financing 0.075     0.263     0.067       0.251           0.151     0.358     0.040     0.196     
  Islamic 0.052     0.222     0.024       0.154           0.030     0.170     0.083     0.276     
  Import loans 0.002     0.045     0.000       0.010           0.002     0.039     0.004     0.061     
  Leasing 0.087     0.282     0.137       0.137           0.137     0.137     0.137     0.137     
  Micro credit 0.002     0.050     0.030       0.172           0.017     0.128     0.164     0.370     
  Overdraft 0.447     0.497     0.005       0.071           0.001     0.025     0.002     0.039     
  Term loan 0.032     0.175     0.550       0.498           0.485     0.500     0.355     0.479     
Number of observations 33,245   10,603      7,786     14,856   
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for 33,245 loans to 11,524 borrowers by 21 banks. These loans are further divided by exposure type. High, Medium and Low exposure banks. The banks with
over 8% of their borrowings outside Pakistan are classified as high exposure banks, the banks between 4% to 8% borrowings outside Pakistan are classified as intermediate exposure and the banks
with less than 4% borrowings outside Pakistan are classified as low exposure banks. All the variables are measured in Pakistani Rupee (PKR). For variable definitions, see Appendix Table 2.




Intermediate Exposure 1.89       *** 3.76       *** 1.36       *** 1.39       ***
(3.13)     (14.49)    (4.40)     (5.14)     
Low Exposure 2.43       *** 2.82       *** 0.97       *** 0.99       ***
(7.18)     (11.37)    (4.25)     (4.44)     
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.38       *** 0.14       *** 0.15       ***
(9.43)     (6.01)     (6.22)     
Ln(Assets) 0.98       0.74       * 0.76       *
(1.32)     (1.87)     (1.75)     
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -56.57 *** -19.91 *** -18.76 ***
(-11.73) (-11.88) (-11.76)
Ln(number of branches) -0.77 ** -0.73 *** -0.80 ***
(-1.97) (-2.99) (-3.04)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) -0.30 0.27       0.21       
(-1.08) (1.21)     (0.98)     
Secured 0.39 -0.51 -0.76 **
(0.99)     (-1.64) (-2.44)
Ln(loan size) 0.44       *** 0.52       *** 0.52       ***
(5.72)     (6.60)     (6.55)     
Non performing loan 3.10 *** 4.08 *** 3.86 ***
(6.45)     (6.61)     (6.64)     
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -4.87 *** -4.80 ***
(-46.49) (-41.02)
Ln(Manufacturing production) -65.30 *** -64.73 ***
(-53.33) (-53.46)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Loan type dummies N Y N Y
Bank controls N Y Y Y
R
2
0.006 0.105 0.349 0.351
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 3
Bank lending channel: Intensive margin
This table presents the fixed effects regression results of the impact of financial shock on low and
intermediate exposure banks during the GFC. All regressions include firm fixed effects, regressions 2 to
4 include loan type dummies and bank controls and regressions 3 and 4 include macroeconomic
variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix
Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient, and the bottom
row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** Indicates
significance at the 5% level and *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.



















Foreign -7.24 *** -11.96 *** -2.61 ** -2.64 ***
(-8.89) (-5.27) (-2.47) (-2.63)
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.26 *** 0.10 *** 0.11 ***
(7.93)    (5.97)     (6.03)     
Ln(Assets) 2.86 ** 1.21 ** 1.23 **
(2.20)    (2.16)     (2.08)     
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -47.35 *** -16.49 *** -15.23 ***
(-11.22) (-8.79) (-9.18)
Ln(number of branches) -2.13 *** -1.10 *** -1.16 ***
(-2.84) (-3.31) (-3.35)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) -0.29 0.28 0.20
(-1.22) (1.34)     (0.99)     
Secured -0.02 -0.63 ** -0.90 ***
(-0.04) (-2.11) (-2.98)
Ln(loan size) 0.45 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 ***
(5.74)    (6.62)     (6.58)     
Non performing loan 3.02 *** 4.08 *** 3.85 ***
(5.13)    (7.17)     (7.07)     
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -4.90 *** -4.83 ***
(-41.01) (-37.93)
Ln(Trade deficit) -65.04 *** -64.42 ***
(-49.36) (-49.19)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Loan type dummies N N N Y
Bank controls N Y Y Y
R
2
0.003 0.103 0.348 0.350
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
(1) (3) (4)
Table 4
Bank lending channel for "foreign" banks
This table presents the fixed effects regression results on the bank lending channel for
"foreign" banks. All regressions include firm fixed effects, regressions 2 and 4 include loan
type dummies, bank controls and macroeconomic variables. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each independent
variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-
statistic in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** Indicates significance
at the 5% level and *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.






   
Intermediate Exposure -0.06 *** -0.07 *** 0.01 -0.04
(-8.44) (-2.85) (1.08)        (-1.13)
Low Exposure -0.03 *** -0.05 ** 0.02 *** 0.26 ***
(-2.68) (-2.12) (3.82)        (7.27)        
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.02 ***
(-2.62) (-1.63) (4.76)        (8.16)        
Ln(Assets) -0.06 *** -0.15 *** 0.04 *** 0.32 ***
(-7.70) (-6.32) (6.43)        (8.39)        
Liquid assets to total assets ratio 0.20 *** -0.29 -0.41 *** -3.02 ***
(2.87)        (-1.31) (-8.44) (-9.60)
Ln(number of branches) 0.05 *** 0.16 *** -0.03 *** -0.21 ***
(7.55)        (9.13)        (-6.38) (-7.62)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) -0.03 *** -0.13 *** 0.04 *** 0.21 ***
(-3.34) (-17.56) (18.44)       (16.53)       
Secured 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.07
(0.54)        (0.54)        (-1.23) (-1.19)
Ln(loan size) -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 ***
(-3.73) (-32.40) (-34.05) (-37.21)
Non performing loan -0.10 *** -0.18 *** 0.20 *** 0.55 ***
(-3.12) (-6.39) (19.21)       (13.96)       
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth 0.11 *** 0.51 *** -0.19 *** -0.94 ***
(13.95)       (48.79)       (-124.38) (-66.64)
Ln(Manufacturing production) 1.15 *** 5.11 *** -2.07 *** -13.14 ***
(12.50)       (27.87)       (-51.54) (-45.59)
Firm fixed effects Y N Y N
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y





0.130 0.121 0.553 0.578
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE Probit FE
Table 5
Bank lending channel: Extensive margin
This table presents the fixed effects and Probit regression results on the extensive margin of bank lending
channel. All regressions include firm fixed effects except regressions 2 and 4, loan type dummies, bank
controls and macroeconomic varaibles. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the
variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated
coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10%
level,  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level and *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Exit Entry
OLS OLS
Relatively low -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 ** -0.02 *** 0.01 0.01 0.10 *** 0.01 ***
(-5.26) (-3.61) (-2.03) (-4.13) (1.60)     (1.61)   (2.61)   (3.74)   
Small firms 0.28 *** 0.97 *** 0.33 *** -0.03*** -0.15 *** -0.03 ***
(25.82) (33.27) (49.25)  (-4.43) (-3.22) (-8.11)
Small firms*Relatively low -0.02 * -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00
(-1.86) (-0.58) (-1.45) (1.42)   (0.80)   (0.59)   
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 ***
(-2.84) (-5.27) (-3.64) (-9.27) (3.31)     (4.71)   (7.43)   (9.05)   
Ln(Assets) -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.16 *** -0.07 *** 0.04 0.04 *** 0.27 *** 0.05 ***
(-8.12) (-7.02) (-6.57) (-13.07) (1.39)     (6.14)   (7.19)   (15.11) 
Liquid assets to total assets ratio 0.14 ** 0.20 *** -0.05 0.11 ** -0.44 *** -0.45 *** -3.82 *** -0.56 ***
(2.32)   (2.76)   (-0.25) (2.44)    (-10.27) (-9.67) (-12.96) (-19.63)
Ln(number of branches) 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.14 *** 0.05 *** -0.03 -0.03 *** -0.21 *** -0.04 ***
(6.94)   (6.51)   (7.74)   (11.97)  (-1.58) (-6.33) (-7.63) (-14.57)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.13 *** -0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.21 *** 0.04 ***
(-3.30) (-11.20) (-17.11) (-23.05) (5.58)     (18.62) (16.94) (35.83) 
Secured 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.00
(0.61)   (0.28)   (0.15)   (-0.62) (-0.98) (-1.15) (-1.20) (0.43)   
Ln(loan size) -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 *** -0.01 ***
(-3.72) (0.55)   (0.28)   (3.33)    (-28.27) (-31.39) (-33.09) (-53.62)
Non performing loan -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.19 *** -0.08 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.54 *** 0.13 ***
(-3.14) (-6.40) (-6.73) (-12.75) (6.65)     (19.26) (13.87) (31.25) 
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth 0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.54 *** 0.12 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.93 *** -0.19 ***
(14.04) (44.45) (48.85) (84.03)  (-118.94) (-123.55) (-66.67) (-206.39)
Ln(Manufacturing production) 1.16 *** 1.10 *** 5.45 *** 1.28 *** -2.07 *** -2.06 *** -13.1 *** -2.16 ***
(12.89) (18.01) (28.60) (33.37)  (-25.40) (-51.36) (-45.55) (-89.87)
Firm fixed effects Y Y N N Y Y N N
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y





0.129 0.178 0.179 0.219 0.553 0.554 0.576 0.557
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 59,183 33,245 33,245 33,245 59,183





(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
FE FE Probit FE
(4) (8)
This table presents the fixed effects, Probit and OLS regression results on the extensive margin of bank lending channel when we consider small firms. 
All regressions include firm fixed effects except regressions 3, 4, 7 and 8, loan type dummies, bank controls and macroeconomic variables. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row reports the 
estimated coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10% level,  ** Indicates significance at the 








Relatively low 1.17 *** 1.15 *** 1.32 *** 1.21 ***
(5.35)     (6.23)     (5.95)     (8.74)    
Small firms -0.74 *** -0.45 -1.53 ***
(-3.72) (-1.54) (-9.36)
Small firms*Relatively low -0.45 -0.57 ***
(-1.38) (-2.97)
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 ***
(6.64)     (7.60)     (7.61)     (13.17)  
Ln(Assets) 0.80 * 0.81 *** 0.83 *** 1.41 ***
(1.83)     (3.51)     (3.60)     (10.19)  
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -17.79 *** -17.94 *** -17.87 *** -18.45 ***
(-11.03) (-9.65) (-9.61) (-16.54)
Ln(number of branches) -0.78 *** -0.76 *** -0.78 *** -1.03 ***
(-2.88) (-4.46) (-4.55) (-10.03)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) 0.21 0.21 *** 0.20 *** 0.59 ***
(0.96)     (2.68)     (2.63)     (13.06)  
Secured -0.79 ** -0.77 ** -0.75 ** -0.45 **
(-2.53) (-2.13) (-2.08) (-2.13)
Ln(loan size) 0.52 *** 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.39 ***
(6.56)     (44.25)    (44.18)    (51.92)  
Non performing loan 3.86 *** 3.86 *** 3.85 *** 2.36 ***
(6.69)     (9.13)     (9.11)     (14.88)  
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -4.80 *** -4.79 *** -4.79 *** -5.26 ***
(-41.02) (-77.71) (-77.72) (-145.30)
Ln(Manufacturing production) -64.8 *** -64.64 *** -64.65 *** -68.85 ***
(-54.05) (-40.29) (-40.30) (-72.56)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y N
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y
Bank controls Y Y Y Y
R
2
0.351 0.351 0.351 0.373
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 59,183
(4)(1) (2)
Table 7
Bank lending channel for small firms
This table presents the fixed effects and OLS regression results on the bank lending channel for
small firms. All regressions include firm fixed effects except regression 4, loan type dummies,
bank controls and macroeconomic variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For
definitions of the variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row
reports the estimated coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. *
Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** Indicates significance at the 5% level and ***
Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Log change in bank lending





Relatively low 0.95 *** 1.75 *** 0.77 *** -0.24
(5.81)      (9.46)      (3.97)      (-0.86)
Private banks 1.53 *** 4.45 ***
(4.81)      (11.73)    
Private banks*relatively low -3.52 ***
(-8.81)
Big banks -1.48 *** -3.09 ***
(-3.69) (-5.91)
Big banks*relatively low 1.98 ***
(5.73)      
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.17 *** 0.20 *** 0.13 *** 0.15 ***
(6.70)      (7.59)      (5.80)      (6.26)      
Ln(Assets) 0.84 ** 0.95 ** 0.14 -0.05
(2.26)      (2.54)      (0.26)      (-0.09)
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -15.69 *** -20.63 *** -19.25 *** -22.82 ***
(-8.55) (-9.68) (-11.93) (-13.55)
Ln(number of branches) -0.45 * -0.44 * 0.06 0.37
(-1.68) (-1.65) (0.14)      (0.78)      
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23
(0.97)      (0.91)      (0.97)      (1.00)      
Secured -0.83 *** -0.84 *** -0.93 *** -0.86 ***
(-2.69) (-2.71) (-3.06) (-2.76)
Ln(loan size) 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 ***
(6.53)      (6.48)      (6.56)      (6.57)      
Non performing loan 3.79 *** 3.77 *** 3.77 *** 3.74 ***
(6.35)      (6.34)      (6.10)      (5.84)      
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -4.79 *** -4.75 *** -4.78 *** -4.73 ***
(-44.25) (-41.94) (-44.76) (-45.24)
Ln(Manufacturing production) -65.04 *** -65.58 *** -64.48 *** -64.08 ***
(-56.53) (-56.17) (-51.16) (-46.94)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y
Bank controls Y Y Y Y
R
2
0.352 0.353 0.351 0.352
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
(4)(1) (2) (3)
Table 8
Bank lending channel for different types of banks
This table presents the fixed effects regression results on the bank lending channel for private and
big banks. All regressions include firm fixed effects, loan type dummies, bank controls and
macroeconomic variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the
variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated
coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the
10% level,  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level and *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Log change in bank lending




Relatively low 1.17 *** 1.27 *** 1.15 *** 1.13 *** 1.04    *** 0.94    ***
(5.35)   (5.05)   (4.77)   (4.85)   (4.06)   (3.05)   
Export loan -0.29 -0.03
(-0.56) (-0.06)
Export loan*relatively low -0.38
(-1.22)
Islamic loan -0.31 -0.68
(-0.90) (-0.83)
Islamic loan*relatively low 0.44
(0.54)   
Agri loan -4.58 *** -6.44 ***
(-6.31) (-7.53)
Agri loan*relatively low 5.22    ***
(5.41)   
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.15    *** 0.14    ***
(6.64)   (6.54)   (6.27)   (6.25)   (6.05)   (5.40)   
Ln(Assets) 0.80 * 0.81 * 0.77 * 0.76 * 0.80    * 0.77    *
(1.83)   (1.87)   (1.90)   (1.87)   (1.83)   (1.80)   
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -17.79 *** -17.78 *** -19.01 *** -18.95 *** (17.86) *** (18.05) ***
(-11.03) (-11.01) (-10.83) (-10.64) (-11.01) (-10.99)
Ln(number of branches) -0.78 *** -0.79 *** -0.71 *** -0.71 *** (0.74)   *** (0.72)   ***
(-2.88) (-2.95) (-2.81) (-2.80) (-2.92) (-2.90)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.22    0.24    
(0.96)   (0.95)   (1.18)   (1.19)   (0.97)   (1.01)   
Secured -0.79 ** -0.81 *** -0.53 * -0.53 * (0.75)   ** (0.75)   **
(-2.53) (-2.64) (-1.72) (-1.73) (-2.46) (-2.48)
Ln(loan size) 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52    *** 0.52    ***
(6.56)   (6.56)   (6.62)   (6.61)   (6.63)   (6.61)   
Non performing loan 3.86 *** 3.86 *** 4.09 *** 4.09 *** 3.79    *** 3.78    ***
(6.69)   (6.70)   (6.70)   (6.74)   (6.69)   (6.79)   
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth -4.80 *** -4.80 *** -4.88 *** -4.88 *** -4.78 *** -4.78 ***
(-41.02) (-40.83) (-44.94) (-43.94) (-38.80) (-38.25)
Ln(Manufacturing production) -64.80 *** -64.76 *** -65.42 *** -65.45 *** -64.40 *** -64.36 ***
(-54.05) (-53.92) (-54.38) (-54.85) (-54.49) (-55.10)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
R
2
0.351 0.351 0.349 0.349 0.352 0.352
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
(6)
Table 9
Bank lending channel for different types of loans
This table presents the fixed effects regression results on the bank lending channel for export, Islamic and agriculture
loans. All regressions include firm fixed effects, loan type dummies, bank controls and macroeconomic variables.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix Table 2. For each
independent variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in
parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** Indicates significance at the 5% level and *** Indicates
significance at the 1% level.
Log change in bank lending
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Relatively low 1.17 *** 1.08 *** 1.10 *** 1.10 *** 0.86 *** 1.10 *** 0.86 ***
(5.34)       (5.18)       (3.63)       (3.63)       (2.67)       (3.63)       (2.71)       
Ln(1+No of previous loans) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.18)       (0.17)       (0.17)       (0.17)       (0.15)       (0.17)       (0.15)       
Market share -19.48 *** -19.39 *** -19.38 *** -19.45 *** -19.39 *** -19.48 ***
(-4.39) (-3.78) (-3.78) (-3.81) (-3.78) (-3.82)
Market share*relatively low -0.20 -0.17 -0.06 -0.20 -0.04
(-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.01)
Relationship dummy -0.04 -0.48 **
(-0.31) (-1.98)
Relationship dummy*relatively low 0.64 **
(2.41)       
REL number 0.30 -15.39 *
(0.06)       (-1.69)
REL number*relatively low 22.80 **
(2.22)       
Bank characteristics
Capital ratio 0.15 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 ***
(6.62)       (6.47)       (6.74)       (6.69)       (6.67)       (6.71)       (6.70)       
Ln(Assets) 0.80 * 1.52 *** 1.53 *** 1.53 *** 1.53 *** 1.53 *** 1.53 ***
(1.83)       (3.89)       (3.61)       (3.62)       (3.65)       (3.62)       (3.64)       
Liquid assets to total assets ratio -17.80 *** -14.43 *** -14.38 *** -14.38 *** -14.43 *** -14.38 *** -14.43 ***
(-11.05) (-8.07) (-8.10) (-8.09) (-8.09) (-8.09) (-8.09)
Ln(number of branches) -0.78 *** -0.52 * -0.52 -0.52 -0.53 -0.52 -0.53
(-2.88) (-1.68) (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.61) (-1.62)
Borrower/loan characteristics
Ln(maturity) 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.96)       (0.88)       (0.88)       (0.88)       (0.88)       (0.89)       (0.88)       
Secured -0.79 ** -0.61 * -0.61 * -0.61 * -0.60 * -0.61 * -0.60 *
(-2.54) (-1.96) (-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.91)
Ln(loan size) 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 ***
(6.56)       (6.60)       (6.59)       (6.62)       (6.63)       (6.62)       (6.63)       
Non performing loan 3.86 *** 3.87 *** 3.87 *** 3.87 *** 3.87 *** 3.87 *** 3.87 ***
(6.71)       (6.81)       (6.80)       (6.85)       (6.86)       (6.84)       (6.85)       
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth
-4.8 *** (4.79)       *** (4.79)       *** (4.79)       *** (4.79)       *** (4.79)       *** (4.79)       ***
Ln(Trade deficit) (-41.03) (-44.10) (-44.79) (-44.11) (-44.52) (-44.21) (-44.59)
-64.8 *** (64.91)     *** (64.91)     *** (64.91)     *** (64.94)     *** (64.92)     *** (64.96)     ***
(-54.08) (-55.34) (-55.03) (-55.21) (-55.20) (-55.23) (-55.22)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan type dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R
2
0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351
Number of observations 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245 33,245
(6) (7)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Table 10
Bank lending channel and information asymmetry
This table presents the fixed effects regression results on the dynamics of information on the bank lending channel. All regressions include firm fixed
effects, loan type dummies, bank controls and macroeconomic variables. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. For definitions of the variables, see
Appendix Table 2. For each independent variable, the top row reports the estimated coefficient, and the bottom row reports the t-statistic in parentheses. *
Indicates significance at the 10% level,  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level and *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.Log change in bank lending





2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United States of America 2,457,623    1,245,627    1,592,077    1,420,631    2,046,680    2,085,948    
China 2,408,284    3,550,471    4,011,344    2,781,915    3,811,769    4,791,694    
United Arab Emirates 2,166,537    652,189      1,768,073    1,811,002    3,412,873    4,897,792    
Afghanistan 926,559      748,185      1,362,075    1,252,701    1,546,291    2,460,766    
Germany 492,740      401,416      585,628      551,895      4,372          311,664      
Spain 378,858      374,992      354,304      292,044      339,721      386,373      
Bangladesh 210,949      216,917      336,385      291,263      562,908      864,494      
Turkey 199,700      286,457      334,867      254,967      488,415      595,803      
United Kingdom 193,614      273,853      132,923      161,359      478,298      676,944      
Netherlands 171,002      147,637      255,460      40,733        62,098        245,535      
Italy 74,123        133,405      43,999        124,515      75,523        265,851      
Belgium 44,666        154,244      169,996      141,852      269,856      382,946      
Trading partners of Pakistan
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Lndifference (Lijb) Difference between the natural logarithm value of pre crisis and post crisis loan amounts
Independent variables
Lender Characteristics
High exposure banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks that have over 8% of total borrowing outside 
Pakistan, 0 otherwise 
Intermediate exposure banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks that have between 4% to 8% of total borrowing 
ouside Pakistan, 0 otherwise
Low exposure banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks that have below 4% of total borrowing outside 
Pakistan, 0 otherwise
Relatively low exposure banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks with international loans below 8% and 0 otherwise
Exit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is not renewed at some point during the Global 
Financial Crisis period of July 2007 to March 2009.
Entry Dummy variable equal to 1 if a new loan is made after the Global Financial Crisis of July 
2007 to March 2009.
Islamic banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for Islamic banks, 0 otherwise
Private banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for private banks 0, otherwise
Privatized banks Dummy variable equal to 1 for banks that were previously government owned but were 
privatized during the financial liberalization era (hence privatized), 0 otherwise
Bank Characteristics
Capital ratio Capital ratio of the bank
Ln(Assets) Natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank
Liquid assets to total assets ratio Ratio of all liquid assets (assets which can easily be converted to cash) of the bank to total 
assets
Ln(number of branches) Natural logarithm of the number of bank branches
Borrower/Loan Characteristics
Ln(maturity) Natural logarithm of the level of the maturity amount
Secured Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan is secured and 0 otherwise
Ln(loan size) Natural logarithm of loan amount outstanding
Non performing loan Dummy variable equal to 1 if NPL amount exists, 0 otherwise
Small firms Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is classified as small and 0 otherwise
Export loans Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan is export loan and 0 otherwise
Islamic loans Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan is Islamic loan and 0 otherwise
Agri loans Dummy variable equal to 1 if loan is Agri loan and 0 otherwise
Ln(1 + no of previous loans) Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of previous loans made to a borrower
Market share Market share of deposit of a bank in percentage
Relationship dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is previous relationship with lender, 0 otherwise
REL number Ratio of the number of loans advanced by a bank to a borrower and the total number of 
loans advanced by that bank
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP growth Gross Domestic Product growth
Ln(Manufacturing production) Natural logrithm of manufacturing production
CPI Consumer Price Index
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate
Ln(Trade deficit) Natural logrithm of trade deficit
Interest rate Interest rate
Ln(Broad money) Natural logrithm of broad money (M2)
Appendix Table 2
Variable Definitions
